Author(s)

R. Mosetti

Abstract

A two agents non-cooperative model is applied in the context of tourism. It is shown that a sharing of resources between the public and private sector gives an optimal solution which is stable in the sense that for both agents the deviation from the optimal solution is not convenient. The optimal solution corresponds to the social optimum. Keywords: sustainable tourism, non-cooperative game theory. 1 Introduction Tourism is a typical industry in which externalities are present due to the access to common resources (Tyrrell [1], Sinclair [2]). The problem is under the so-called \“tragedy of commons” (Hardin [3], Ostrom [4]) in which each economic subject is trying to maximise his own profit from common resources like the environment. Action has to be undertaken by the public sector (local, regional or national authorities) in order to re-allocate the non-optimal equilibrium arising from such externalities. This paper is a short note concerning the application of game theory to a situation in which the private sector and the public one are the agents in a non-cooperative game. Some application of game theory to social conflicts is reported for instance in Binmore [5]. 2 A two-agent model A two agents model is considered to investigate the optimal solutions. The first actor is the private sector, the second the public services.

Keywords

sustainable tourism, non-cooperative game theory.