Financial liberalisation and financial market development: the case of Tunisia

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Abstract

The economies of developing countries that are in debt are generally characterized by under-developed financial markets. ‘A stylized fact about financial systems in developing countries is that they are dominated by commercial banks’ (Fry, In Favour if financial liberalization, 1996). This was true of Tunisia, that by adopting financial reforms, it sought to make a dynamic financial market in order to insure a transition from credit to market economy. In this context, it appears useful to evaluate and quantify the impact of the adopted reforms on the development of the Tunisian financial market. Few studies have tried to explore this subject and they have all resorted to compare certain indicators of financial market development before and after the introduction of reforms.

Within the framework of this paper, we suggest using intervention models in order to quantify (measure) the importance and the nature (transitory or permanent) of the effects of each adopted reform.

Keywords: financial reforms, financial liberalization, intervention models, transitory and permanent effects.

1 Introduction

Since 1987, Tunisian authorities, convinced by arguments which show that liberalization can stimulate economic development and by the successful experiences of many countries whose economic growth was rapid, have adopted a strategy of financial and economic reforms. The overall objective of these reforms was to create a market-based economy directed by the private sector, while keeping more and more open to international trade and capital.
The Tunisian financial system has witnessed, since 1987, many structural and conjunctural changes following the adoption of many financial reforms. The objective was to switch from a debt-economy toward a capital-market economy. Before 1987, Tunisian financial system was characterized by under-developed financial markets and was also dominated by commercial banks. Therefore, by adopting financial reforms, Tunisian authorities sought to make a dynamic financial market.

In this context, it will be useful to evaluate and quantify the impact of the adopted reforms on the development of the Tunisian financial market. Studies that have tried to explore this are generally rare. They have all resorted to compare certain indicators of financial market development before and after the introduction of reforms [2–4]. Nevertheless, such a procedure does not permit to measure separately the importance and the nature of the effects of each adopted reform.

In order to detect the impact of the adopted reforms on the Tunisian financial market’s development, we suggest using intervention models introduced by Box and Tiao [5]. The reason behind using these models is to measure the importance and the nature of changes brought about by a known event or a process. More specifically, we use these models in order to measure the impact of new financial reforms on the evolution of certain variables reflecting financial market development. Intervention analysis allows us to perform the following.

- Isolate the impact of a well-determined reform.
- Decompose the impact of a reform into two constituent parts: one that measures the long-term effect and a second one that measures the short-term impact. These models enable us therefore to study the nature of shocks (transitory or permanent).

This paper will be divided into six sections. We start first by a theoretical and empirical literature review related to the effects of financial liberalization, this will be the subject matter of the first two sections. The fourth section is a general presentation of multivaried and univaried intervention models. The next section is dedicated to the presentation of endogenous and exogenous variables in our study. Finally, and before developing intervention models, a descriptive analysis of different indicators within financial market development will be presented.

2 Theoretical foundations of financial liberalization

A large number of works are interested in studying the effects of financial liberalization. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) assert that financial liberalization, by increasing real interest rates, favours growth of financial saving and increases potentialities of credits for investors. Consequently, investment, that plays an important role in the economic growth process, will increase.

Other works [1,6,7] assert that financial liberalization, while favoring the development of new means of desintermediated financing (direct financing), develops financial markets and make them more dynamic. A liberalized financial structure allows a range of financial assets that could stimulate saving, as well as encouraging firms to be quoted so as to benefit from foreign financing and
increased transactions on financial markets; since the exchanged shares are constantly increasing. Moreover, development of financial markets may assure a better resource-allocation, this will positively affect the economic growth of the country. Nevertheless, financial liberalization might have negative effects on the soundness of the financial system. Fry [1] asserts that financial liberalization risks causing a transaction multiplication on financial markets that has no direct relation with the production and international financial exchanges. In this way, ‘speculative bubbles’ can appear; value of stocks and money increases while the economic situation of the concerned countries does not justify such a price take-off.

Furthermore, financial liberalization can engender a systemic crisis risk. That is why many works are interested in the relation between financial liberalization and bank system soundness. Weinstein and Yafeh [8], Henry [7] and Gurben et al. [9] suggested that financial liberalization can divert clients toward market financing. This might have positive consequences on the firms’ performance, however the greatest freedom of action provided to banks after financial liberalization can encourage them to a high level of risk taking. Since competence related to the control of borrowers and the management of risky borrowings can be acquired only progressively, the risk of bank insolvency and generally the risk of systemic crisis might be higher for the recently liberalized financial systems.

Financial liberalization, deregulation and opening of financial systems on the exterior create a new environment to financial institutions and they might lead to a better capital allocation in the country. They can also affect banks solvency, putting in danger the financial system in general and the bank system in specific.

3 Financial liberalization and financial market-development: empirical literature review

Numerous works have been carried out in the study of the impact of financial liberalization. At first, studies were mainly interested in the macro-economic effects of financial liberalization. After that, and with the aim of determining canals of transmission between financial liberalization and economic growth, studies are interested in the impact of financial liberalization on the financial sector development as well as on the functioning of non-financial firms.

Papers interested in the effects of financial liberalization on financial sector development can be grouped into two sets:

- Those that try to study the effects of the financial liberalization on financial market-development.
- Works that try to study the effects of the financial liberalization on banks performance.

Studies that try to explore the financial liberalization-financial market development relation are generally rare. They have resorted to the simple time-based comparisons (‘before and after’ analysis) that consist in studying some indicators of financial market development before and after financial liberalization.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine [10] collected and compared a set of indicators of financial market-development related to 41 developed and developing countries in the period 1986-1993. Having described each indicator used, the paper then examined the relation between these different indicators of financial-market development, as well as the relation between these indicators and the different measures of financial intermediation development. The indicators used of financial market-development are related to the size of financial market, its liquidity, its volatility, its concentration and its regulation.

Analysing these different indicators for 41 developed and developing countries, authors have noticed that:

- The developments of financial markets differ from one country to another.
- The different indicators are significantly correlated. This suggests that different indicators capture different aspects of financial market development. Liquidity ratios are, in fact, positively correlated, financial market size is positively correlated with its liquidity and negatively correlated with its volatility, market-size and liquidity are negatively correlated with its concentration. Finally, countries that have well-developed regulation system tend to have large and liquid financial markets.

In his research paper, Osei [3], tried to compare the following indicators of financial market development over time [stock market capitalization, transaction-volume, rotation-ratio of stocks and shares on the Stock Exchange, the (stock market capitalization/G.D.P) ratio and the (transaction-volume/G.D.P) ratio]. He found that financial liberalization has favored the development of Ghana Stock and Shares Exchange. In fact, following reforms adoption, these indicators have experienced a significant increase.

### 4 Presentation of unvaried and multivariated intervention models

Box and Tiao [5] provided a general strategy to model the effects of interventions on a unvaried A.R.I.M.A (Auto-Regressif Integrated Moving Average) process. The suggested model is the following

\[
Y_t = f(\delta, \omega, \zeta, t) + N_t
\]

With:
- \(Y_t\): a time series (\(Y_t\) is observed)
- \(f(\sim, \sim, \sim, t)\): a function of parameters \(\sim, \sim\), of an exogenous variable and of time.
- \(N_t = Y_t - f(\sim, \sim, \sim, t)\): the series without intervention.

The function \(f(\sim, \sim, \sim, t)\) describes the effects (measured by \(\sim, \sim\)) of the exogenous variable \((\sim)\) on the \(Y_t\) variable at each \(t\) instant.
To take into consideration the effect of a time intervention at $t=T$, exogenous variable should be replaced by an auxiliary variable $T_i$. According to Box and Tiao, the effect of an intervention on the $Y_t$ variable can be represented by the following dynamic model:

$$f(\delta, \omega, \zeta, t) = \frac{\omega_s(B)B^b}{\delta_r(B)} \cdot \zeta_i^T$$

(2)

With:

- $\omega_s(B) = \omega_0 - \omega_1B - ... - \omega_sB^s$, the parameters of $\omega_s(B)$ represent the initial intervention effects.

- $\sim_i(B) = 1 - \sim_1B - ... - \sim_iB^i$: represents the behavior of the permanent intervention effect

- B: delay operator

- b: a parameter that represents the delay between $Y_t$ and $T_i$ variables, that is the time-lag between the intervention and its impact.

The series $N_t$ is represented by a stationary A.R.I.M.A. (p, d, q) model such as:

$$\phi_p(B) \cdot \nabla^d \cdot N_t = \theta_q(B) \cdot a_t$$

(3)

by substituting (2) and (3) in (1), we obtain the following intervention model:

$$Y_t = \frac{\omega_s(B)B^b}{\delta_r(B)} \cdot \zeta_i^T + \frac{\theta_q(B)}{\phi_p(B) \cdot \nabla^d} \cdot a_t$$

(4)

The intervention variable can be either:

- a step-intervention variable defined as:

$$S_t^T =
\begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } t \geq T \\
0 & \text{if } t < T 
\end{cases}$$

This variable is designed to assess the effect, on $Y_t$, of a phenomenon starting at date T (example: change of regulation).

- a pulse-intervention variable defined by:

$$S_t^T =
\begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } t = T \\
0 & \text{if } t \neq T 
\end{cases}$$

It is designed to assess the effect, on $Y_t$, of a phenomenon taking place only at date T (example: strike).

In general, if we suppose that the series $Y_t$ is submitted to “k” interventions that take place at dates $t = T_1, T_2, ..., T_k$ with $T_1 < T_2 < ... < T_k$, thus, the general intervention model is the following:

$$Y_t = \frac{\omega_1(B)B^{b_1}}{\delta_1(B)} \cdot \zeta_i^{T_1} + \frac{\omega_2(B)B^{b_2}}{\delta_2(B)} \cdot \zeta_i^{T_2} + ... + \frac{\omega_k(B)B^{b_k}}{\delta_k(B)} \cdot \zeta_i^{T_k} + \frac{\theta_q(B)}{\phi_p(B) \cdot \nabla^d} \cdot a_t$$

(5)
Interventions can affect many time series. The effect of interventions can differ from one series to another. In order to modelize simultaneously these effects, Abraham (1980)[11] has generalised Box and Tiao’s [5] results on multiple series. His model presents the effects of K events that take place at the dates \( t = T_1, T_2, ..., T_k \) and that affect endogenous variable-vector \( Z_t \).

\[
Z_t = R(B) \cdot I_t + N_t
\]  

Model (7) comprises two different components: a determinist component that describes the intervention and its impact, and a stochastic component.

Initially, it is difficult to identify a model for the stochastic term \( N_t \) since it is affected by the effects of interventions. So, the first step consists in the identification of an ARIMA(p, q) model for \( Z_t \) vector using the (T-1) observations related to each \( Z_{it} \) series (T indicates the date of the first intervention). The second step is the estimation of the model as it was identified above. The exogenous intervention component of the model cannot be identified using rigorous statistic techniques. This portion is generally identified using time series graphs. The last step consists of an estimating intervention model.

5 Presentation of endogenous and intervention variables

In our case, intervention variables are the adopted financial reforms. Endogenous variables are the indicators of the Tunisian financial market development.

5.1 Intervention variables

Intervention variables are the adopted financial reforms as presented in table 1. The date of each reform corresponds to the date of intervention.

The table suggests the following remarks:
- The described interventions are step-intervention variables, and not pulse-intervention variables since they are meant to explain a phenomenon that starts at a date “T” and not a phenomenon that takes place just at the date “T”.
- Since financial liberalization in Tunisia is progressive, the used intervention dates are the dates of the beginning of each step in the reform process.

5.2 Endogenous variables

The endogenous variable-vector \( Z_t \) includes development indicators related to:
- The size of financial market measured by (stock-market capitalization/G.D.P) ratio (noted later on “Incap”)
- The liquidity of financial market measured by transaction-volume (noted later on “Involt”) and by the asset-rotation ratio on the Stock exchange market measured by (transaction-volume/stock-market capitalization) ratio (noted later on “Inrot”).
Table 1: Intervention variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention-dates</th>
<th>Introduced reforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(S_0) January 1987</td>
<td>Interest-rate liberalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (S_1) January 1988 | - Adoption of prudential norms  
                        - Reorganization of the monetary market  
                        - Deletion of the preliminary authorization and the rediscount agreement |
| (S_2) April-May 1989 | - Revision of the B.V.M.T. status  
                        - Institution of a currency-monetary market  
                        - Opening of the monetary market to a largest number of operators |
| (S_3) January 1993 | - Current dinar convertibility decision  
                        - Exoneration of benefits on stocks and shares  
                        - Promotion of investment firms and recasting of their legal framework |
| (S_4) end 1994  
beginning 1995 | - Privatization of the B.V.M.T.  
                        - Conditioning the daily variation of each stock price by the realization of a minimal transaction-volume of 50000 dinars |
| (S_5) February 1996 | - Lower minimal transaction-volume per session to 30000 dinars  
                        then to 5000 dinars |
| (S_6) November 1996 | - New system of electronic cotation  
                        - Deletion of rediscount even for priority sectors  
                        - Creation of “Société Tunisienne Interprofessionnelle de Compensation et de DEpôt des Valeurs Mobilières (S.T.I.CO.DE.VA.M)” |

5.3 Study period

The study period stretches out from the year 1981 up to the year 2003 (monthly data). We have 276 observations decomposed in this way: 72 observations (1981-1986) before the first reform and 204 observations (1987-2003) after that.

6 Descriptive analysis

Within the framework of this section, we try, first, to compare the evolution of financial market development indicators before and after the introduction of reforms and second, we study the relations that may exist between these indicators.

6.1 Before-after analysis

The size of the financial market, measured by (stock-market capitalization/G.D.P) ratio has clearly increased (cf. Figure 1). The share of the
stock market capitalization in relation to the G.D.P. has, in fact, passed from 4% in 1990 to 23% in 1996. However, this ratio decreased after that (cf. Table 2).

Graphics representing transaction-volume as well as (transaction-volume/stock-market capitalization) ratio show that financial market has become more liquid as a result of the introduction of reforms.

However, we have noticed that this increase of ratios was not lasting (cf. Figures 2 and 3). That is why we can expect interventions (introduced reforms) to have transitory effects and not permanent ones on financial market liquidity.

Table 2: Share of the stock-market capitalization in relation to the G.D.P. (percentage).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Stock-market Capitalization/G.D.P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: “Lncap” series.

Figure 2: “Involt” series.
6.2 Correlations between different indicators of Tunisian financial market development

Correlation coefficients between different indicators of Tunisian financial market development are significant and positive (cf. Table 3).

Table 3: Correlations between different indicators of B.V.M.T development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incap</th>
<th>Lnvolt</th>
<th>Lnrot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incap</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lnvolt</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lnrot</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These correlations suggest that different indicators capture different aspects of financial market development. Furthermore, this table enables us to make the following conclusions:

- Financial market size is positively correlated with liquidity ratios. Then, as the size of financial market increases, it becomes more liquid.
- Capitalization and rotation ratios are correlated. Nevertheless, correlation coefficient is only of 0.52, which implies that financial market size is not the only determinant of its liquidity. Likewise, a small market does not necessarily suffer from a liquidity problem. A small market (with a weak (stock-market capitalization/G.D.P) ratio) can, have an important ratio of rotation, which reflects an active and liquid market.

7 Results and interpretations

We have first developed a univaried intervention model for each series. Then, and in order to eliminate cross and contemporary correlations between series, we have developed a multivaried intervention model that allows a joint estimation of equations related to the three series.
7.1 Univaried models

7.1.1 (Stock-market capitalization/G.D.P) series in logarithm [noted “Incap”]

7.1.1.1 Identification of a model for the $N_t$ series without interventions

Graphic representation as well as autocorrelation functions showed that the series is not stationary. A differentiation of order (1) was not sufficient. A differentiation of order (12) showed that all autocorrelations were significantly equal to zero. Autocorrelations and partial autocorrelation-functions allowed the identification of an ARIMA(1,12,1) model.

Estimation of this model showed that coefficient associated with ($\phi_t$) is not significant. Thus, ARIMA(1,12,0) model was estimated:

$$\text{(7)} \quad (1-B^{12})(1-0.2637.B)\ln\text{cap}=0.0703+\varepsilon_t$$

To have a valid model, residuals have to form a white noise. Autocorrelation function of residuals showed that all autocorrelations are significantly null. This model was then valid.

7.1.1.2 Study of intervention effects

Estimation of the model (9) identified above for the period following the first, the second as well as the third intervention ($S_0$, $S_1$ and $S_2$) showed that the model remains always valid. In fact, residuals form a white noise. Estimation of this model for the period following the fourth intervention ($S_3$) showed that the model identified for the period before interventions is not valid; residuals were autocorrelated.

The following model was then identified and estimated:

$$\text{(8)} \quad (1-B^{12})(1-\phi.B)\ln\text{cap}=c+\frac{\omega_3}{1-\delta_3.B}(1-B^{12}).S_3+\varepsilon_t$$

Table 4: Estimation results of intervention model for “Incap” series.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>$t$-student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cnst</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_3$</td>
<td>0.0134</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_3$</td>
<td>-0.9276</td>
<td>29.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>0.890</td>
<td>32.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.987</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSE</td>
<td>0.0933335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.1.2 Transaction-volume series in logarithm [noted “Involt”]

Following the same steps as for the first series, this intervention model was identified and estimated:

$$\text{(9)} \quad (1-B)(1-\phi_{12}.B^{12}).\ln\text{volt}=$$$\omega_3.(1-B).S_3+$$\omega_4.(1-B).S_4+$$\omega_5.(1-B).S_5+$$\omega_6.(1-B).S_6+(1-\theta.B)(1-\theta_{12}.B^{12}).\varepsilon_t$$
Table 5: Estimation results of intervention model for “Involt” series.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>t-student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_3$</td>
<td>0.1422</td>
<td>6.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_4$</td>
<td>-0.4026</td>
<td>-8.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_5$</td>
<td>0.5437</td>
<td>6.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_6$</td>
<td>-0.2815</td>
<td>-4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_1$</td>
<td>0.8135</td>
<td>22.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{12}$</td>
<td>0.7825</td>
<td>13.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{12}$</td>
<td>0.8071</td>
<td>18.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.877</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.1.3 Asset-rotation rate on the “B.V.M.T.” in logarithm [noted “lnrot”]

Following the same methodology as for transaction-volume series, this model was identified and estimated:

\[
(1-B)(1-\phi_{12}.B^{12}) \ln rot = \omega_3.(1-B).S_3 + \omega_4.(1-B).S_4 + \omega_5.(1-B).S_5 + \omega_6.(1-B).S_6 + (1-\theta_1.B)(1-\theta_{12}.B^{12}).\epsilon_t
\]  

Table 6: Estimation results of intervention model for “lnrot” series.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>t-student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_3$</td>
<td>0.0984</td>
<td>5.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_4$</td>
<td>-0.3381</td>
<td>-8.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_5$</td>
<td>0.5630</td>
<td>7.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_6$</td>
<td>-0.3226</td>
<td>-5.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_1$</td>
<td>0.8594</td>
<td>26.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{12}$</td>
<td>0.7547</td>
<td>11.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{12}$</td>
<td>0.7939</td>
<td>16.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSE</td>
<td>0.633336</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Multivariated intervention model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>$\omega_3$</td>
<td>0.0348</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>$\omega_3$</td>
<td>-0.0029</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_3$</td>
<td>0.0104</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>$\omega_4$</td>
<td>-0.2076</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>$\omega_4$</td>
<td>-0.1717</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_3$</td>
<td>0.9252</td>
<td>25.32</td>
<td>$\omega_5$</td>
<td>0.4405</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>$\omega_5$</td>
<td>0.4464</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>0.9018</td>
<td>47.63</td>
<td>$\omega_6$</td>
<td>-0.2696</td>
<td>-1.30</td>
<td>$\omega_6$</td>
<td>-0.2752</td>
<td>-1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_1$</td>
<td>0.1782</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>$\theta_1$</td>
<td>0.1751</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{12}$</td>
<td>0.3746</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>$\phi_{12}$</td>
<td>0.4036</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>
7.2 Multivaried intervention model

Financial market-development indicators are correlated. So, the three equations should be jointly estimated in order to eliminate cross and contemporary correlations between series. Joint estimation of the three developed models provided the following results (cf. table 7).

Multivaried model can thus be presented in this way:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1-B^{12})(1-0.9018)\ln cap &= \frac{0.0104}{1-0.9252}B - (1-B^{12})S_3 + \epsilon_t \\
(1-B)(1-0.3746.B^{12})\ln volt &= 0.0348(1-B)S_3 + (-0.2076)(1-B)S_4 + 0.4405(1-B)S_5 + (-0.2696)(1-B)S_6 + \\
&\quad (1-0.1782.B)(1-(-0.0395).B^{12}).\epsilon_t \\
(1-B)(1-0.4036.B^{12})\ln rot &= 0.0029(1-B)S_3 + (-0.1717)(1-B)S_4 + 0.4464(1-B)S_5 + (-0.2752)(1-B)S_6 + \\
&\quad (1-0.1751.B)(1-(-0.0142).B^{12}).\epsilon_t
\end{align*}
\]

According to estimation results of the multivaried intervention model, we may notice that determination coefficients (R²) have increased. By eliminating correlation effects between variables, we obtain better forecasts. The calculation of forecast-gap (for the period starting from January 2003 to September 2003), which is designed to compare forecasts provided by multivaried model to those provided by univaried model, permits to show an improvement in the quality of forecasts.

Table 8: Forecast-gaps.

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>Ln cap</th>
<th>In volt</th>
<th>In rot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Univaried model</td>
<td>0.06017719</td>
<td>0.67157933</td>
<td>0.53718004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multivaried model</td>
<td>0.04153033</td>
<td>0.50648535</td>
<td>0.48172749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{Forecast gap} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{9} (\text{observation}_i - \text{forecast}_i)^2}{n}
\]

8 Interpretations

8.1 Financial market size

The intervention (S3) has had a positive and significant effect on the series. This effect was both weak and significant (\(\omega_3=0.0104\)) but was progressive and has been long lasting since \((\delta_3)\) is very close to \((1)(\delta_3=0.9252)\). This reform has, therefore, allowed a progressive increase in the size of the Tunisian financial market. Graphic representation of the series confirms this result. The Tunisian
financial market has known, a remarkable growth since 1993. The striking downturn of interest rates on saving books and fiscal exemption of benefits on stocks and shares, associated with the recasting of the legal framework of investment firms, have favored the increase of quoted firms on the B.V.M.T. This permitted a progressive increase of the stock market size, as shown by Figure 7.

Figure 4: “Lncap” series: comparison between forecasts of univaried and multivariied models.

Figure 5: “lnrot” series: comparison between forecasts of univaried and multivariied models.

8.2 Financial market liquidity

The recasting of the Tunisian stock exchange status, as well as different measures adopted at the beginning of 1993 (fiscal encouragements, promotion of investment firms), have made the market more active and liquid.

The effect of (S3) intervention was positive, weak and for the short-term. Transaction-volume has marked a growth from 1993 to 1994. This evolution resulted in a price-inflation, which has no relation with reality. Fearing “speculative bubbles”, authorities, adopted at the beginning of 1995, regulation
measures that condition daily variations of stock prices by realizing a minimum transaction-volume. The maximum variation of prices was fixed to ±3% in comparison with the medium price of the set of transactions of the previous session provided a minimum transaction-volume of 50000 dinars per session. This reform (S₄) resulted in an important decrease in transaction-volume and, therefore, in the ratio of assets rotation. This was a negative, significant and short-term effect ($\omega_4 = -0.2076$). The (S₅) intervention (decrease of the minimum transaction-volume to 5000 dinars) had a positive and significant effect.

Figure 6: “Involt” series: comparison between forecasts of univariated and multivariated models.

Figure 7: Transitory and permanent effects of reforms on financial market size.

New reforms adopted during 1996 and at early 1997 had permitted, in fact, a significant increase of asset-rotation ratio on the B.V.M.T. The creation of the S.T.I.CO.DE.VA.M. combined to the 1996 installation of a new system of electronic quotation was likely to ensure a high level of transaction-transparency that restores the trust of savers.

Finally, it has to be noted that the adopted financial reforms have had transitory (short-term) effects and not permanent effects on financial market liquidity. In fact, as a result of each reform, transaction-volume as well as
rotation ratio vary. Nevertheless, the answer is not lasting and the effect of this reform disappears quickly. This seems to reflect operators who are not mature enough and susceptible to change. This may be a source of financial market fragility.

9 Conclusion

Financial reforms have had a significant impact on the development and the dynamism of the Tunisian financial market. Indicators related to the size and liquidity of the financial market have clearly increased during the period (1993-1998). The effects of reforms on financial market size was lasting, whereas its effects on liquidity was transitory. Then, it seems that, following the adoption of financial reforms, the number of quoted firms increased but the market has not known a lasting revival of its activity and liquidity (as measured by transaction-volume and asset-rotation ratio). This joins the idea that the size of the financial market is not the only determinant of its liquidity. This can be due to the lack of reliable data about firms and to the lack of transparency in terms of stock information. This can yield a lack of confidence from savers whose participation in the stock exchange market would be low.

Furthermore, we note that since 1999, there has been a progressive decrease in the size of the financial market. This can be due to the slow rhythm of privatization process of firms, to the lack of transparency in terms of stock information and to the small number of private firms making their entry in the stock exchange.

References


